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The right to be forgotten – private law enforcement
T.F.E. Tjong Tjin Tai∗
Department of Private Law, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Private law enforcement of the right to be forgotten should be considered in light of the
general characteristics of private law. This highlights advantages and limitations, and
underlines the need to explicate the actual interests involved in the right to be
forgotten. As case law and real-life examples show, enforcement is mostly feasible
but may be costly. The right to be forgotten is most effective against large, bona fide
corporations. This analysis provides a more realistic view of the possibilities of
private law enforcement of newly proclaimed rights.
Keywords: enforcement; private law; right to be forgotten
1. Introduction
One of the more contested elements of the 2012 EU proposal for a new regulation on data
protection is the so-called right to be forgotten (Proposal for a Regulation on data protection
2012). As I will try to show, there are considerable complications with this ‘right’, when
seen from the viewpoint of private law. The right to be forgotten appears to be constructed
more as an ideal rather than an effective tool for enforcing a desirable state of affairs. The
right may not add much to the current legal instruments for removing undesirable personal
data. Nonetheless, the introduction of the right to be forgotten may at least provide a coher-
ent ideal in this area and, in incidental cases, additional relief.
For my argument I will start with theoretical considerations, after which I will discuss
the obstacles in the practical application of the right to be forgotten. I will use the two
general cases as examples to illustrate my reasoning. The argument will be based on
general principles of private law that – it is my contention – hold for all Western jurisdic-
tions behind the various divergent specific rules. Sometimes I will refer to specific
examples, mostly from Dutch law.
2. General aspects of private law and private remedies
A common critique of European Union legislation in the area of private law is that it is
strongly instrumentalist. (cf. Collins 2008, 108–120; extensively Schmid 2010; and
more generally Tamanaha 2006). This tendency is explicit in documents such as the
Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules.1 The disagreement
between civil lawyers and governance-oriented legislation in effect has ancient roots, and
can be traced back to the duality between natural law and positive law (for example,
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Samuels 2003, 21–35, 65–71) as well as the authority of law professors from the middle
ages onwards (for example, Jansen 2010 and Koschaker 1966). The self-image of private
law practitioners and scholars is that, although private law can and is formed by decisions
from the legislator (state), the material content of private law should rather be decided by
private law experts, striving for coherence or systematic structure, with minimal influence
of state policy. Although this dichotomy appears to be more a matter of political theory or
public law, it is driven by a fact that is not always fully acknowledged – the fact that private
law is ill suited to function as an instrument of state governance (cf. Collins 2008, 108–
115). To substantiate this statement, we need to highlight several aspects of private law
and relate these to the right to be forgotten.
Private law, as it is traditionally known, is often said to fulfil two primary aims: protec-
tion of interests (particularly where this is done by rights such as the right to property) and
enforcement of contracts (see the general survey in Tjong Tjin Tai 2010, 396–404; and for
example Locke 1988, nr. 85 and 134; Smith 1979, 910 (s. V.iii); MacCormick 2007, 228).
Although many private law rules have other goals (such as facilitating transactions, provid-
ing certainty), it is true that the aforementioned two goals form the core of private law. In
this categorisation, the right to be forgotten is a form of protection of interests.
The protection and enforcement that private law provides is provided in individual
cases, at the request of specific individuals. The litigation of such cases does not intrinsi-
cally serve public policy aims, except insofar as providing individual remedies simul-
taneously accords with public policy. The advantage of the private law approach is that
enforcement is left in the hands of individuals, and is only invoked where this serves the
actual interests of the individual in question. Indeed, it would hardly be desirable if the
government would sua sponte have to intrude in every case to check for possible infringe-
ment of a right, in particular as apparent infringements of bodily integrity or privacy may
actually be voluntarily accepted (such as in the case of medical treatment or romantic
engagements). Both to keep individual privacy free from unnecessary government intrusion
as well for reasons of efficiency2 the essential private law reliance on individual claims is
desirable.
A major disadvantage of relying on individual claims is that such claims may fail
because the costs of litigation is too high, or for other individual reasons, even where
there would be a public benefit if certain actions were to be discouraged. Government
supervision may in such cases be beneficial as a supplementary safeguard, in particular
in cases of large-scale infringement or when the individual victim is unable to actually
defend his rights (for example with children). Government supervision can and often
does take place outside private law, or is done by government organisations that use
private law instruments, which sometimes are tailored to facilitate such supervision, as in
the case of private law proceedings by a Consumer Authority.
The traditional view of private law is nowadays challenged by a different approach,
which (in Europe) can be found particularly in European Union legislative initiatives, in
which private law is considered primarily as a regulatory instrument (Collins 2008,
108–115). According to this approach, the value of private law lies in its fitness to
promote policy aims. Admittedly, such aims may be furthered also by creating and enfor-
cing individual rights. However, in the traditional view new rights are implemented by fine-
tuning a system of rights in which rules are shaped by balancing interests with a view to
coherence. In contrast, the governance approach operates by demanding that the right is
effective.3 It is up to the national legislator and courts to realise this effectiveness within
the national legal system. It is therefore not the sole availability of private claims in
theory that counts, as well as the actual effectiveness of such claims when they are
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made. This reasoning may lead to making available additional remedies or setting aside
inordinate restrictions on claims.
Before closing this general overview, we have to consider another angle. The ‘right to
be forgotten’ is a right, but what kind of right? The very act of calling it a ‘right’ implies a
protected core. Various authors have discussed the construction of a right to personal data as
analogous to a property right (for example, Purtova 2011 and various articles: Schwartz
2004). Provisionally we may follow this approach, which seems to rest primarily on the
notion of property as an erga omnes claim against intrusions and concomitant immunity
(no changes in legal relations without consent). We should note, however, that property
has a positive aspect for the owner, to wit the enjoyment of a thing (for example Penner
1997; also Alexander and Peñalver 2012, referring to the lawyer’s view as property invol-
ving ‘resources’, a ‘thing’ (Alexander and Peñalver 2012, 2), versus some theorists who
focus on the ‘right to exclude’ (Alexander and Peñalver 2012, 3)). Property rights seek
to protect this enjoyment. Personal data do not have a positive value as such; the right to
be forgotten is a defensive right without a core notion of what it protects (see further
Section 3). This is important, as declaring a right is not sufficient for how it turns out in
practice: rights are balanced against competing interests, and the underlying interests in
the right are weighed in that balancing.
3. The right to be forgotten as a private law right
At first sight, the right to be forgotten seems to be simply another new right that can be
assimilated into the existing body of private law. The logical place is within tort law,4 as
the right can exist without a contractual agreement. In the absence of specific rules, the indi-
vidual will have to take recourse to tort law and its concomitant remedies. The rules of tort
law may – given the need to make the right effective – be supplemented with additional
rules for new remedies or for exceptions to the general rules. As we shall see, the proposed
right follows this structure. Hence, we should look at the interest harmed, and the remedies
that have to be provided.
Within private law, we have a large array of remedies, in particular claims to (specific)
performance, damages, injunctions and other interim measures. However, in order for these
to be awarded, there must be sufficient justification. The general basis of a claim in tort law
is to be found in harm to a certain interest,5 which may include the violation of a right.6
Such harm is to be balanced against the other interests involved in the case.7 The Proposal,
cons. 53, explicitly allows for overriding reasons against the right to be forgotten. In par-
ticular, art. 80 Proposal provides an exception for media, which allows processing of per-
sonal data ‘solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression’.
This, in effect, means that in a significant number of cases the right to be forgotten does not
apply (Van Hoboken 2012, 127–128).
According to the general rules of private law, a sufficient interest for removing personal
data is to be found in significant harm; the mere possibility of fraud, etc., would, in the
absence of specific statutory rights, probably be insufficient for obtaining remedies. If we
look at the two example cases in particular, the first case may be successful, provided
that the non-defamatory material still leads to non-negligible harm. Dutch case law provides
several examples, (cf., in general, Pinckaers 1996; also HR 14 June 2013, NJ 2015/112
(Cruijff)) such as psychological harm following publication of a photograph of a kissing
couple,8 or the interest of famous persons in commercially exploiting their fame.9 With
the second case, general private law would probably provide insufficient grounds for an
action to have data removed. Such an action is to my knowledge only successfully
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instigated on the basis of specific statutory provisions, in particular (for the Netherlands) in
the Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens,10 which is the implementation of the Data protection
Directive (95/46/EC). These provisions11 contain explicit exceptions12 that give expression
to a balance between opposing interests, as determined by the legislator.
So what are the relevant interests? The problem is that the right to be forgotten is still not
theorised very well. The interests harmed appear to be more theoretical and immaterial than
actually concrete, material (see also more generally Purtova 2011, 43–5]).13 We can ident-
ify four interests at the basis of the Proposal:14
(a) the fundamental right of control over personal data,15
(b) material damage because of identity fraud,16
(c) immaterial and material damage because of possible risks regarding abuse of data
and incorrect or unlawful conclusions on the basis of such data.17
(d) the general diminishing of autonomy because of the existence of uncontrolled per-
sonal data.18
Given the fact that the materially most important of these interests are actually risks,19
not actualised harm, the weighing of interests is not so much fundamental and right-based20
as based on a balancing of the interests involved: is there a lawful interest in collecting,
storing and processing the data, or not? In the former case, the rather intangible interests
supposedly protected by the right to be forgotten could easily be overridden, in particular
when sufficient safeguards have been installed or when stronger interests rise at the oppos-
ing side. For example, the rather stringent right to privacy of Princess Caroline of Monaco21
could be overridden when she again becomes the object of relevant contemporary public
interest.22
The possibility of an unsatisfactory balancing act is greater than with the right to prop-
erty, as the paradigmatic kind of property (real property) is usually not often the subject of a
conflicting legitimate interest.23 Storage and use of personal data, on the other hand, are
useful and even unavoidable in today’s information society. For these reasons, the right
to be forgotten appears intrinsically weaker than a property right.
4. Enforcing the right to be forgotten
It is with respect to enforcement that the right to be forgotten may really come into its own,
as the right should be effective in order not to be illusory. However, it is in this area that
significant problems arise, even disregarding technical problems. (On which see, among
others, the report ENISA 2012. The report also discusses practical problems.) Two
example cases may illuminate these problems.
4.1. The first case
The first case involves an individual who wants to remove (non-defamatory) personal infor-
mation from the internet. In order to do so, he has to know where the data actually is stored,
and then approach all relevant parties in order to have the data removed.24 This is no easy
task, as the data may be stored all over the world, and the responsible actors may similarly
be located anywhere. Even if these actors respond to polite requests, this takes a significant
effort. If requests are not followed, legal proceedings become necessary, the costs of which
may well be prohibitive, in particular when litigating in numerous jurisdictions (since one
usually needs at least one lawyer for each jurisdiction).
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Assuming the plaintiff is awarded an order for removing data (and a corresponding
injunction), the question is whether the order is followed. The execution of such orders
is costly, and may in fact be difficult to achieve in jurisdictions with ineffective judicial
systems in this respect. Also, it may seem easy to check whether the order has been com-
plied with (as the data then would no longer be present at its original location), but that is
not necessarily true. It is possible that the data can still be found at another part of the
website. Furthermore, the data may still be stored on back-ups (ENISA 2012, par. 4.3) a
data carrier or in cloud storage, which is practically impossible to prevent. Finally, there
remains the possibility that as yet unknown third parties have kept private copies
(ENISA 2012, par. 4.2) and that these copies will in the future be put online.
Despite these difficulties, it is by and large feasible to have undesirable data removed
from the internet if one is sufficiently persistent,25 in particular when money is no
object.26 It should be noted that this mostly applies to cases in which there is only a national
interest. If the case involves an internationally well-known person, chances are that infrin-
gements are made internationally as well, which may prove much harder to combat.
4.2. The second case
The second case involves an individual who wants to have a company remove his personal
data that was obtained from the internet. This case is even more difficult to enforce.
First of all, the individual has to know (and be able to prove) that the company has his
personal data stored. Except where the individual has specific access to that company’s data
storage, it is difficult and costly to obtain such proof, as that would require proceedings to
obtain a court order for obtaining evidence. The corresponding costs far exceed what most
individuals would pay for such a slight intrusion. Hence, enforcement could only proceed if
the individual would not have to bear these costs,27 either because the company freely
admits the fact, or because the costs are spread out by collective action or are born by a
representative agency. Otherwise he is dependent on government agencies.
Secondly, if proof is available but the company remains unwilling to act, there are sig-
nificant costs to obtaining a court order. Again, the costs have to be shared or shifted if
private enforcement is to be efficacious.
Finally, after obtaining the court order, we meet the same obstacles as with the first case in
ensuring actual compliance with the order. These obstacles are higher than in the first case, as
the direct harm of a company possessing such data is even more slight than with undesirable
information on the internet, hence the costs are not easily justified by the benefit.
4.3. Further considerations
Enforcement therefore is a hazardous enterprise for private citizens.28 Indeed, even for
right-holders in the somewhat similar field of IP-rights, enforcement is often difficult and
costly to achieve.29 Only if the company complies with its duty to inform the individuals,
and is willing to follow individual requests, may the aims of the regulation be fulfilled.
Hence, the proposed regulation is only effective in the case of bona fide companies that
are willing to cooperate and comply with the law. We should not belittle this achievement,
as such companies can still have a major impact on individual lives (e.g. insurance compa-
nies, health care, banks, major internet service providers as Facebook and Google). None-
theless, this has little effect on the more egregious abusers. This conforms to the experiences
with the current regulations on privacy.
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In fact, the current rules already provide most of the tools to enforce a right to be for-
gotten on the basis of existing private law (similarly, see Van der Sloot 2012, 254). The right
to be forgotten is therefore more symbolic than a major improvement.
An alternative to individual private enforcement is collective action, which might
provide a useful supplement to companies who only reluctantly respond to legal pressure.
Such collective action may be instigated by private parties, and provides an additional level
of protection and enforcement above public law.
Furthermore, the public law route by supervisory entities exists and may be useful on
occasion. However, in general, it appears that privacy supervisory agencies are unable to
enforce more than a relatively small proportion of the market. As this chapter concerns
the private law viewpoint, I will not discuss this further.
These considerations imply a rather limited scope of the right to be forgotten. It appears
that the right is easily limited by competing legitimate interests, in particular as there is no
clear or traditionally known positive content of the right, in contrast to property rights. Fur-
thermore, even if the right to be forgotten should prevail, it is difficult to enforce. The
strength of private law is that it empowers individual citizens, the flip side of this is that
it needs to be invoked by individuals. Hence, it only works if there is sufficient individual
interest to make the effort of a procedure worthwhile (besides collective claims). We might
say that private law appropriately bars trivial claims, hence it ensures that there is a worth-
while case to consider. However, for the right to be forgotten this barrier may be too high for
ordinary individuals, and may prohibit action in precisely the kinds of cases that the pro-
posed right is intended to cover.
Nonetheless, we should not be too pessimistic. The right to be forgotten may also be
viewed as an important step towards recognition and ultimately proper enforcement of
the interests contained in such a right (therefore I agree with authors such as Purtova
2011 and Schwarz 2004).
5. Conclusion
The right to be forgotten appears to be more a symbolic gesture than an actually effective set
of rules regarding private law enforcement. Simply stating a right without considering how it
can actually be enforced is a political act, which needs legal sophistication to ensure results.
Probably the most significant result will be that legitimate large companies are being called
out for infringements, while more shady actors are left alone. This is not useless: the activities
of Google and Facebook are indeed worrying from the point of view of privacy, and there is
some solace in the idea that a specific regulation provides ground for claims towards such
companies. In particular, it makes it easier to prove that there is an actual legitimate interest
that is harmed and deserves protection, as up to now this might be doubtful. However, we
should not forget that existing law already goes a long way to provide a certain amount of
protection, and could be developed further to accommodate this new ‘right to be forgotten’.
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Notes
1. COM(2005) 672, 19 December 2005.
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2. Hence the need to discourage negligible claims: de minimis non curat praetor.
3. As embodied in the principle of effectiveness, both operative in EU-law (Tridimas 2006, 418–
476) and in the case law of the ECHR (for example EHCR 9 October 1979, case 6289/73 (Airey
v. Ireland), par. 24). The contemporary ascendance of human rights is therefore not a return to
the classic mode of private law reasoning, even though it also involves primarily individual
rights.
4. I use this in the neutral sense as the law of non-contractual liability, or law of delict, not in the
specific meaning of a category within English law.
5. Cf. art. 2:101 PETL and compare the approach of the BGB in enumerating specific protected
interests. In common law, harm is also a requirement for a claim, just like dommage in
French law. Art. VI.I:101 DCFR uses the concept of legally relevant damage, which in this
context is sufficiently close to harm to a protected interest.
6. This also encompasses violation of a property right.
7. There may be special rules that lay down a specific balance, or the balancing may be left to the
judge on the basis of case law. Proposal, cons. 53 (‘when required by law’) allows exceptions on
the basis of (statuary or case) law.
8. HR 1 July 1988, NJ 1988/1000 (Vondelpark).
9. HR 14 June 2013, NJ 2015/112 (Cruijff), HR 19 January 1979, NJ 1979/383 (’t Schaep).
10. Or its predecessor, the Wet persoonsregistratie.
11. For example art. 10-12, 14-15, 22-23 Data protection directive 95/46/EC, and the implemen-
tation of these articles in national legislation.
12. For example in art. 11(2), 13, 15(2), 23(2) Data protection directive 95/46/EC, and the
implementation in national legislation.
13. See also more generally Purtova (2011, 43–50).
14. There is an additional constraint by the demand of effectiveness (cons. 9).
15. Cons. 1-2, 6, 129, 133 Proposal.
16. Cons. 67, 116ff. Proposal.
17. See cons. 16ff, in particular 38, also 121-126 Proposal.
18. This seems to be implied in cons. 55 and 70 Proposal. This interest in fact is already recognised
partially in the guise of the interest in a good reputation, protected through actions against defa-
mation. However, these actions can generally only be invoked for serious violations, not for
more mundane acts like publicising a person’s hobbies (as was inter alia at stake in ECJ 6
November 2003, case C-101/01 (Lindqvist).
19. As seems to be recognised explicitly (cons. 53 Proposal).
20. Which would imply a principled rejection of all intrusions.
21. ECHR 24 June 2004, case 59320/00 (Von Hannover/Germany).
22. ECHR 7 February 2012, case 40660/08 and 60641/08 (Von Hannover/Germany no. 2).
23. And where it is, this may in fact quite well justify the intrusion. Furthermore, even for property
in tangible objects the mere risk of future intrusions does not quickly justify a prohibition.
24. Admittedly a short-cut may be through taking action against gatekeepers such as ISPs, however
this is only of limited value given the sheer possible number of ISPs. To be true, it may be partly
effective only to take on the largest search engines (in particular Google), as that may for most
purposes lead to the non-visibility of the data for the larger public, which may be what is
desired.
25. A Dutch example is the removal of a video clip of a drunk student, which was originally made
available through geenstijl.nl. After an injunction was obtained, the video appeared at other
places, publicised by anonymous individuals, for which geenstijl.nl was not responsible. See
Rb Amsterdam 14 July 2010, LJN BV4359, 10 August 2011, LJN BT1877, and 10 February
2011, LJN BP3926. In the end the efforts seem to have succeeded: the video is at present not
easily found, if it can be found at all.
26. An example is an incorrect allegation regarding an abduction victim, which was removed com-
pletely from all public records, due to the lawyer’s efforts paid for by her millionaire father (see
generally http://www.netkwesties.nl/249/miljonair-steekt-tonnen-schoonwassen.htm, and for
case law, for example, Hof Amsterdam 8 May 2008, LJN BD1356).
27. This issue is similar to what was found for private enforcement of competition law, where it was
recommended to find ways to lower the costs (White Paper on Damages actions for breach of
EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final, p. 9).
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28. The analogy with property is misleading as ‘real’ property infringement is relatively easy to
prove, as well as to enforce against. This is not to gainsay the motivational advantages of a prop-
erty right to personal data, which Purtova (2011) stresses.
29. See the additional remedies in Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 195 of 2
June 2004, see Cornish et al. (2003, 447–449). The similarity lies in the fact that IP-infringement
is also not directly perceived, in contrast to infringement (trespass) to real property.
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